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Liabilities Under
WESTK.:VIRGINIA
LAWPromoter's
REVIEWContracts
Joint tenants.Special problems have arisen where plural renters
contract for a single safe-deposit box. Breach by the deposit company of a provision that the bank will give access to the renters
only jointly and not individually may render the company liable
for the contents removed from the box. 44
Whether the renters are joint tenants with rights of survivorship in the contents has been answered in line with the current
disfavor of joint survivorship, by refusing to find a joint tenancy
in the absence of a clear intention disclosed by the terms of the
4
instrument. "
C. B. F.
W. T. S.

Li~mLrrms UNDER PROiOTES CoNTRAcT.-It is often necessary
in the organization of a corporation for those persons promoting.the
organization to make contracts with outsiders on behalf of the
proposed corporation before its organization is completed. The
necessity for such contracts raises many problems with regard to the
liabilities of the promoters, the corporation, or both. Before an
understanding of these problems is possible, it is necessary to ascertain just exactly what a promoter is. "A promoter is a person who
brings about the incorporation and organization of a corporation,
and who brings together the persons who become interested in the
enterprise, and who aids in procuring subscriptions and sets in
motion the machinery which leads to the formation of the corporation."' A promoter is not the agent of the corporation and
cannot contract for it.2 This is because the organization of the
corporation has not been completed and thus there is no principal
in existence. Several West Virginia cases have spoken of the promoters as agents although it seems that the court did not actually
3
treat them as such.
It has been held throughout the United States that a corporation is not liable upon contracts made on its behalf by its promoters before incorporation unless after incorporation it expressly
44 First National Bank v. Fite, 131 Tex. 525, 115 S.W.2d 1105 (1958).
4In re Jirovec, 285 Ill.
App. 499, 507, 2 N.E.2d 354, 357 (1936).
I Cox v. National Coal & Oil Investment Co., 61 W. Va. 291, 56 S.E. 494
Clifton" v. Tomb, 21 F.2d 895 (4th Cir. 1927); BALLANTINE, MANUAL OF
CORPORATION LAW & PRACTICE 155 (1930).
3Wallace v. Eclipse Pocahontas Coal Co., 85 W. Va. 521, 98 S.E. 293 (1919);
McCullough v. Clark, 81 W. Va. 743, 95 S.E. 787 (1918).

(1907).
2
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or impliedly makes itself a party to the contract. 4 This rule is
followed in West Virginia. 5 The reason for the rule is that the
corporation was not in existence at the time the contract was made,
and thus was not originally a party to the contract. The English
rule is that the corporation cannot make itself a party to the
promoter's contract in any manner even after incorporation.,
However, in the United States the corporation can make itself a
party to the contract after its organization, either expressly or
impliedly. 7 The corporation cannot adopt the contract unless it
is a contract that the corporation could have made in the first
place 8 After its organization, a corporation, cannot make itself a
party to a contract which is ultra vires or illegal. Providing that
the contract is an adoptable one, the courts find corporate liability
under four theories: ratification, adoption, continuing offer, or
novation. 9 The ratification theory is criticized on the ground that
a party cannot ratify who was not in existence when the contract
was made. It is well settled in West Virginia that the corporation
can become liable on the promoter's contract,10 but it is difficult to
determine upon which of the above theories the liability is founded.
Several earlier cases seem to find the liability under the adoption
theory," while several later cases speak in terms of ratification-2
without discussing the technical criticism of that theory.
Whatever theory is used there is the additional question of
what acts are necessary to imply liability where the corporation
has not expressly made the contract its own. Such liability can be
implied from any conduct which shows an intention to be bound
by the contract. 3 The most frequent example of such conduct is
acceptance of the benefits with knowledge of the terms of the contract. There are several West Virginia cases holding the corpora4

BALLANTINE,

op. cit. supra note 2, ff 46.

5 Ramsey v. Brooke County Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 102 W. Va. 119, 135 S.E.

249 (1926); Clifton v. Tomb, 21 F.2d 893 (4th Cir. 1927).

6BALLANTnNE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 156.

7Ramsey v. Brooke County Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 102 W. Va. 119, 135 S.E. 249
(1926); Wallace v. Eclipse Pocahontas Coal Co., 83 W. Va. 321, 98 S.E. 293
(1919); McCullough v. Clark, 81 W. Va. 743, 95 S.E. 787 (1918); Richardson v.
Graham, 45 W. Va. 134, 30 S.E. 92 (1898); Clifton v. Tomb, 21 F.2d 893 (4th Cir.

1927);

BALLANTNE,

op. cit. supra note 2, at 157.

8 1 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONs 208 (1931).
9 Clifton v. Tomb, 21 F.2d 893 (4th Cir. 1927); BALLANTINE, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 158.
10 Ramsey v. Brooke County Bldg. & Loan Ass'n; Wallace v. Eclipse Pocahontas Coal Co.; McCullough v. Clark; Richardson v. Graham, all supra note 7.
"'Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Deepwater Ry., 57 W. Va. 641, 50 S.E. 890
(1905); Richardson v. Graham, 45 W. Va. 154, 50 S.E. 92 (1898).
12 Cases cited note 5 supra.
13 BALLANTINE,

op. cit. supra note 2, at 157.
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tion liable on this principle.J4 In Ramsey v. Brooke County Building 8c Loan Ass'n,15 it was held that the corporation was liable for
attorney fees for services procured by the promoter. This indicates
a departure in West Virginia from the rule stated above as in this
case the court stated that the corporation would be liable for the
reasonable value of the attorney fees without even indicating an
intention to be bound. In other words, the law implies a contract
that the corporation pay the attorneys the reasonable value of
their services. However, it is submitted that this departure from
the general rule only applies to the circumstances of that particular
case, and that in other situations the corporation will have to
show by conduct an intention to be bound. Then the corporation
will be liable on the contract rather than quasi-contractually as in
the Ramsey case.
Before adoption can be implied from the conduct of the corporation, it must be shown that the corporation had full knowledge
of the facts concerning the contract. 16 Question has been raised
as to just what constitutes full knowledge of the facts. In Wallace
v. Eclipse Pocahontas Coal Co.,1 7 it was stated that notice to the
promoters of the corporation of the provisions of a contract made
for and on behalf of the corporation is notice to the corporation
which accepts the benefits of the contract. In Clifton v. Tomb,'8
a federal case involving a West Virginia corporation, the court
held, however, that the knowledge of the promoter could not be imputed to the corporation. It is submitted that the holding in the
latter case is the proper rule, and that the statement in the Wallace
case is merely a dictum because the facts of the case clearly show
that there was a stockholders' meeting at which the contract was
discussed, and therefore all the stockholders present had knowledge
of the contract. Thus, it was not really necessary for the court to
impute the knowledge of the promoter to the corporation in order
to find that the corporation had knowledge of the terms of the
contract.
Another major question is as to the liability of the promoter
under these contracts made with third parties on behalf of the
corporation. To some extent his liability depends on the wording
14 Wallace v. Eclipse Pocahontas Coal Co., 83 W. Va. 321, 98 S.E. 293 (1919).
'5 102 W. Va. 119, 135 S.E. 249 (1926).
16 Ramsey v. Brooke County Bldg. 8: Loan Ass'n, 102 W. Va. 119, 135 S.E.
249 (1926); Wallace v. Eclipse Pocahontas Coal Co., 83 W. Va. 321, 98 S.E.
293 (1919); Clifton v. Tomb, 21 F.2d 893 (4th Cir. 1927).
1 83 W. Va. 321, 98 S.E. 293 (1919).
18 21 F.2d 893 (4th Cir. 1927).
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of the agreement and the understanding of the parties.'0 If the
agreement is worded so that it is merely an offer or an option which
can later be accepted by the corporation, the promoter is not
liable at all.20 On the other hand, he may accept liability with the
clear stipulation that he be released after acceptance by the corporation.21 This is an express novation. The promoter may, by
the agreement, assume personal liability. In that event, he will
not be released from liability even though the corporation adopts
the contract as its own. He remains personally liable unless it
22
can clearly be shown that the parties intended a novation.
Many times nothing is said in the agreement. There is merely
a contract between the promoter and the third party on behalf of
the corporation. In these cases the liability of the promoter will
depend to a large extent on the theory used to hold the corporation
liable. Under the continuing offer theory, the promoter is not
liable at all as there is merely an offer which can be accepted by the
corporation after its incorporation. Under the implied novation
theory, the promoter is liable at the outset, but is released from
liability when the corporation assumes liability. The liability of
the corporation is substituted for that of the promoter. Neither
the continuing offer theory nor the novation theory have ever been
applied in West Virginia. Under the adoption or ratification
theories, the promoter remains liable even after the corporation
has made itself a party to the contract unless it is clearly shown that
a novation was intended so that the corporate liability is substituted
for that of the promoter.23 West Virginia purports to follow either
the adoption or ratification theories and the cases indicate that the
promoter is liable on his contracts on behalf of the corporation
with third parties, 24 and that he remains liable even after the
22
corporation adopts the contract.
R. A. K.

19 BL.LA-uiNE,
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.

op. cit. supra note 2, at 162.

22 Ramsey v. Brooke County Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 102 W. Va. 119, 135 S.E. 249
(1926); Wallace v. Eclipse Pocahontas Coal Co., 83 W. Va. 321, 98 S.E. 293 (1919);
McCullough
v. Clark, 81 W. Va. 743, 95 S.E. 787 (1918).
23
BALLANrNE, op. cit. supra note 2, f"47a.
24
Ramsey v. Brooke County Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 102 W. Va. 119, 185 S.E.

249 2(1926).

5 Cases dted note 3 supra.
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